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Real Estate Investment Truss-Equalzation of
Investment Opportunity or Unjustified
Tax Break to Favored Interests?
A recent amendment to the Internal Revenue Code provides a tax
benefit to those who invest in real estate through the medium of a
trust or an association. A real estate investment trust, which meets
the conditions set forth in the act, is allowed special deductions from
its taxable income. These deductions provide a partial "conduit" for
investment income of the trust, treating the distributions to the
beneficiary as direct investment income similar to distributions from
regulated investment companies., The purpose of this note is to
examine the "stated purposes" of this legislation, with a view to
ascertaining its real potential, its desirability and whether these
"stated purposes" will be fulfilled.2
1. 74 Stat. 998 (1960), Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856-58. This amendment was
enacted as Pub. L. No. 779, approved Sept. 14, 1960, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
2. Real Estate Investment Trust Requirements: A) Definition. The require-
ments are here generally stated without detailed exploration of all the various
possible ramifications. Real estate investment trust is defined as: "an unincor-
porated trust or an unincorporated association, . . . managed by . . .trustees,"
having "transferable shares..., which (but for the provisions of this part) would
be taxable as a domestic corporation"; not holding "any property primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business.... ." The bene-
ficial ownership must be held by 100 or more persons for 335 days of the taxable
year, or a proportionate part thereof. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856 (a) (5),
856 (b). Beneficial ownership must be so distributed that it "would not be a per-
sonal holding company.., if all of its gross income constituted personal holding
company income." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 542, 543, 856 (a) (b). In other words,
at no time during the last half of the trust's taxable year may five or fewer indi-
viduals, directly or constructively, own more than 50% of the trust. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 542 (a) (2). The broad rules of constructive stock ownership in
§ 544 apply. The trust must fulfill these requirements for the entire taxable year
and an election made to be taxed as a real estate investment trust. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 856 (e) (1).
B) Investment Restriction. At least 75% of the "value" of its total assets must
be represented by "real estate assets, cash and cash items (including receivables),
and Government securities. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856 (c) (5) (A). "Real estate
assets" are defined as real property and interests in real property and mortgages
on real property and beneficial ownership in other real estate investment trusts.
The trust cannot invest more than 25% of its total assets in securities other than
the securities that fall within the 75% requirement. Diversified security invest-
ment is required; to wit: the trust cannot have more than 5% of its total assets
invested in any one issuer, nor can the trust hold more than 10% of the out-
standing voting securities of an issuer. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856(c) (5)
(A), (B). Allowance is made for fluctuations in value of the assets of the trust.
A trust meeting the investment requirements at the end of a quarter is not dis-
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
Investment trusts have been used as a medium of common invest-
ment in the United States since the latter part of the 19th century.3
Smaller investors could collectively invest, thereby achieving diversi-
qualified because of a discrepancy during a subsequent quarter, "unless such dis-
crepancy exists immediately after the acquisition of any security or other property
and is wholly or partly the result of such acquisition." If the failure to meet the
requirements at the end of a quarter is due to a purchase in that quarter, the
trust "shall not lose its status for such quarter as a real estate investment
trust if such discrepancy is eliminated within 30 days after the close of such
quarter .... " Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856 (c) (5).
C) Gross Income Requirements. Gross income requirements are imposed which
limit the trust's investments to "passive" real estate investments. First, at least
90% of the trust's gross income must be derived from dividends; interest; rents
from real property; "gain from the sale or other disposition of stock, securities
and real property" and "abatements and refunds of taxes on real property."
Second, 75% of the gross income must be derived from:
(A) rents from real property; (B) interests on obligations secured by
mortgages on real property or on interests in real property; (C) gain from
the sale or other disposition of real property (including interests in real
property and interests in mortgages on real property) ; (D)... distributions
on and gain from the sale or other disposition of, transferable shares [of
beneficial interest] . . .; and (E) abatements and refunds of taxes on real
property. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 856 (c) (2), (3).
"Rents from real property" under the 90% and 75% income requirement
exclude rents that are based, either in whole or in part, upon a percentage of the
income or profits derived by the lessee from the property. Rents are also excluded
if received from a corporation in which the trust owns 10% or more of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock, or, if a person, if the trust has an
interest of 10% or more in the assets or profits of such person. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 856(d) (2). The rules of constructive stock ownership in 318 apply,
except that 10% is substituted for 50% in § 318(a) (2) (C).
The third limitation on the income of the trust is that less than 30% of the
trust's gross income must be derived from the sale or other disposition of "(A)
stocks or securities held for less than 6 months; and (B) real property (includ-
ing interests in real property) not... involuntarily converted . . . [and] held
for less than four years." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856 (c) (4). See § 1033 for
defiinition of involuntary conversion.
(D) Taxation of the Real Estate Investment Trust. A qualified real estate
investment trust which distributes 90% or more of its taxable income, exclusive
of net long-term and short-term capital gains, for the taxable year is entitled to
the tax benefits prescribed in the Act. Distributions from earnings are taxed to
the distributees with a corresponding dividend paid deduction allowed to the trust.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857 (a) (2). A trust which meets the distribution require-
ment is still taxed at the corporate rate on its "real estate investment trust
taxable income." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(b) (1). (Emphasis added.) The
"taxable income" is determined after the following adjustments are computed:
the exclusion of the net long-term capital gain over the net short-term capital loss
if any, and a deduction of dividends paid, computed without regard to capital gains
dividends. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(b) (2) (A) ; see § 858(a). Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 857(b) (2) (B). A separate 25% tax is imposed on the excess of the trust's
net long-term capital gain over the sum of the trust's net short-term capital loss
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fled investment holdings plus expert investment counsel otherwise
available only to investors of substantial wealth. 4 Tax treatment of
the two types varied in the early days of the income tax, but by 1936
and its deduction for dividends paid, determined with reference to capital gains
dividends only. The normal corporate deductions for net operating loss and for
dividends received are not deductible from the taxable income of real estate in-
vestment trusts. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 172, 243-47.
(E) Taxation Beneficiaries. The tax imposed upon a beneficiary of a real
estate investment trust for the distributions of the trust is similar to the tax on
stock dividends. The principal exception from the normal tax treatment is the
provision for capital gain dividends. The capital gain dividend is taxable "as a
gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months."
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(b) (3) (B). A capital gain dividend
is any dividend, or part thereof, which is designated by the real estate
investment trust as a capital gain dividend in a written notice mailed to its
shareholders ... at any time before the expiration of 30 days after the close
of its taxable year. If the aggregate amount so designated with respect to a
taxable year of the trust.., is greater than the excess of the net long-term
capital gain over the net short-term capital loss of the taxable year, the
portion of each distribution which shall be capital gain dividend shall be
only that proportion of the amount so designated which such excess of the
net long-term capital gain over the net short-term capital loss bears to the
aggregate amount so designated. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857 (b) (3) (C).
However, if a beneficiary acquired his interest within 30 days prior to the dis-
tribution of a capital gain dividend, any loss on the subsequent disposition of his
interest is treated as a long-term capital loss to the extent of such dividend. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(b) (4). The test for determining ownership for more
than 30 days is that of § 246(c) (3).
Two other exceptions to the normal tax on stock dividends should be viewed.
Neither the 4% dividends received credit nor the $50 exclusion allowed an indi-
vidual is permitted. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 34(a), 116. The 85 per cent de-
duction on dividends received by corporations is not applicable to real estate in-
vestment trust distributions. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 243, 857 (c).
(F) Current Earnings Problem. If a real estate investment trust fails to
meet the distribution requirement, it would then be taxed as a corporation, and
the beneficiaries taxed as shareholders. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857 (a). The
disadvantage in this is that the current earnings and profits of a trust, but not
the accumulated earnings and profits, may "not be reduced by any amount which
is not allowable as a deduction in computing its taxable income for such taxable
year." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(d) ; see generally, § 857(b) (2). The election
to be taxed as a real estate investment trust carries over to subsequent years, and
is probably irrevocable. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856(c) (1). Thus, the trust
could have a distribution classified as a dividend when the capital loss for the
year equalled the trust's income for that year. For example, if the trust has no
accumulated earnings and profits, but has income of $50,000, and it distributes
$10,000 to its beneficiaries, the distribution is a dividend as the capital loss does
not reduce current earnings and profits. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 857 (d), 857 (b)
(2). The trust, however, could avoid this by failing to meet one of the require-
ments necessary for real estate investment trust status and then be treated as
an association taxable as a corporation. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856.
In addition to the requirements specified in Sections 856-858 the trust may be
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the situation had become established so that income from a public
investment trust was taxed as corporate income5 and distributees of
the income were taxed personally.6
In 1936, regulated open-end mutual investment companies were the
recipients of some relief in the form of a deduction for distributed
profits from their taxable income. 7 The Revenue Act of 1942 ex-
required to file a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat.
74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77a-77aa, and comply with regulatory provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-78y, (for
example: Broker-dealer Registration). Furthermore, compliance with the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat.789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-la to 80a-52,
and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
77bbb, may be required. The trust must also consider the Blue-Sky statutes in
states where the ownership certificates are to be sold and the trust law in states
where the trust plans to hold property. Statutory regulation of business trusts
varies to some noticeable extent from state to state and in many states is uncer-
tain and lacking in precedent. See, e.g., 1 CCH Blue Sky Reporter, 4751-57
(1961); Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate and Other Business Enterprises 177-78
(1958).
3. Kilpatrick, Real Estate Investment Trusts, in 3 House Committee on Ways
and Means, Tax Revision Compendium, 1697-98 (1959).
4. Ibid. Williamson, Realty Investment Trusts Poised for Launching, The
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Oct. 6, 1960, p. 14.
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3797 (a) (3), 49 Stat. 1706 (now Int. Rev. Code of
1964, § 7701(a) (3)).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a), 49 Stat. 1706 (now Int. Code of 1954, §
61(a)).
7. Prior to the new amendment, trusts were taxed as associations. See supra
notes 3 & 4. Hence Congress has not defined the term "association," apparently
content to leave this to judicial interpretation, and to a lesser degree to Treasury
policy. See Revenue Act of 1938 and prior history, and 7 Mertens, Law of Federal
Income Taxation, § 38A.01 (1956). Initially, investment trust beneficiaries were
considered as not being associated, and, therefore, the association was not con-
sidered by the courts as unincorporated corporate equivalents. The reason given
was that they lacked direct control over the trust funds. Crocker v. Malley, 249
U.S. 223 (1919). In 1924, the Supreme Court held trusts, whose trustees perform
similarly to corporate directors while engaged in active business enterprises, tax-
able as a corporation. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924). The Treasury
Regulations agreed, stating that real estate trusts actively engaged in a business
enterprise were taxable as corporations. Passive trusts were excluded. 4 Cum.
Bull. 11; I. t. 1584, 11-I Cum. Bull. I (1923).
In 1935, the question of the tax liability of a real estate investment trust was
again considered by the Supreme Court. The trust in question was organized for
the purpose of purchasing, developing, operating and selling real estate. The trust
formerly operated a country club on land it had developed, but during the tax
year in question it had merely held and rented property. The Court said that the
character of the organization was to be determined by the purpose and powers
stated in the trust instrument and not by the activities pursued. The Court
ignored the passive-active trust distinction holding that trusts organized for profit
making purposes by its beneficiaries with an organizational structure substantially
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tended the tax benefits, liberalized the qualifying requirements and
included closed-end investment companies. 8 Special tax treatment is
still afforded to qualified mutual investment companies., Recently,
annual attempts0 have been made in Congress to remove the so-called
discrimination against the real estate investment trusts in the form
of a deduction for distributed profits from their taxable income. In
1956, such a bill was passed by both houses of Congress but vetoed
by the President.11 In 1960, the House, during the regular session
of Congress, passed a bill to provide special tax relief.12 The Senate
passed, in special session, as an amendment to an omnibus bill, a bill
identical to that of the House. 8 After approval by the House it was
sent to the President. This time the President reversed his previous
position and signed the bill.14
similar to that of a corporation, taxable as a corporation. Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
The effect of the Morrissey decision was to place active and passive public
investment trusts into the "association" classification. This had little impact on
investment trusts specializing in security investments, since no tax was imposed
on dividends received by one domestic corporation from another until 1936.
Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102 (b), 49 Stat. 1015.
Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 12(a), 49 Stat. 1653; § 48(e), 49 Stat. 1669.
A mutual investment company is defined as, "Any corporation (whether chartered
or created as an investment trust, or otherwise) ... if ... it is organized for the
purpose of, and substantially all its business consists of, holding, investing, or
reinvesting in stock or securities."
An open-end company is one which is offering or has outstanding any "re-
deemable security"--defined as a security which entitles the holder on demand
to receive approximately his proportionate share of the issuer's net assets or its
cash equivalent. I Loss, Securities Regulation 145 (2d. ed. 1961).
8. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 361-62, 56 Stat. 878. "Closed-end companies
do not have redeemable securities; they may occasionally offer new securities to
the public as any industrial company does, but the usual way to acquire their
shares is on the open market." I Loss, Securities Regulation 146 (2nd ed. 1961).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 851-56.
10. H.R. 3985, H.R. 3477, H.R. 2992, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 8102,
H.R. 3868, H.R. 3780, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
11. H.R. 4392, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956), passed both houses of Congress but
was vetoed by President Eisenhower. In a memorandum of disapproval, the Presi-
dent gave two reasons for the veto: one, that there is no existing tax inequality
as regulative investment companies have two tiers of taxation as do real estate
investment trusts. Second, that although the provision is intended to be applicable
only to a small number of trusts, it could be available to real estate companies
which have always carried on their activities as fully taxable corporations. 102
Cong. Rec. 15304 (1956).
12. H.R. 12559, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
13. H.R. 10960, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The only difference between the
two bills was a clerical amendment. This became P.L. 86-779 by a Senate Floor
Amendment.
14.. The President signed the bill on Sept. 14, 1960. No reason was given for
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I. SPECIAL TAX TREATMENT OF R.I.T.-
DESIRABLE OR UNDESIRABLE?
The House Ways and Means Committee gave two reasons for the
desirability of this real estate investment trust legislation. 5 First,
equality of tax treatment between the beneficiaries of real estate
investment trusts and the shareholders of regulated investment
companies is desirable since in both cases the methods of invest-
ment constitute pooling arrangements whereby small investors
can secure advantages normally available only to those with
larger resources .... 16
Second, the "committee believes it is also desirable to remove taxation
to the extent possible as a factor in determining the relative size of
investments in stocks and securities on one hand, and real estate
equities and mortgages on the other."' 7
If the Committee meant by the first reason that the legislation is
desirable because it allows the income of an individual investing
through a trust to be taxed in the same manner that the investment
income of a direct investor in real estate is taxed, then a strong
argument can be made in support of the committee's position. If
the trust is passive, limiting its activity solely to investing in real
estate, then its beneficiaries are engaged in substantially the same
activity as the passive direct investor in real estate. In an equitable
sense there does not seem to be any justification for imposing a tax
on the medium through which investment equality is achieved which
thereby destroys, to a large degree, the equality of investment op-
portunity that the trust affords the investor of limited means.
However, if the Committee meant that the legislation is desirable
because it eliminates the discrepancy existing in the tax treatment
afforded the regulated investment company when compared to the
the reversal in his position. In 1959, the Treasury Department stated that it was
no longer opposed to conduit treatment for real estate investment trusts, pro-
viding that such treatment was limited to "passive income." The Treasury
opposed H.R. 3985, H.R. 3477, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), as these allowed the
trust to render services to the lessee through independent contractors. This, the
Treasury felt did not limit the "conduit treatment" to "passive" investment trusts.
Letter from David A. Lindsay, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, to
Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, August 26, 1959,
copy on file Washington University Law Library. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856 (d)
(8) contains the independent contractor provision that the Treasury found ob-
jectionable.
15. H.R. Rep. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), accompanying H.R. 12559,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The trust legislation was passed as H.R. 10960, 86th
Cong., 2d Seas. § 10 (1960), but it merely incorporates H.R. 12559, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960). There was no committee report on H.R. 10960, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 10 (1960).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960).
17. Id. at 4.
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real estate investment trust, then the reasoning is erroneous. Ad-
mitting the structural similarity of the two media, there is a basic
difference in the source of income between the two, which, without
conduit treatment, are taxed differently. The realty trusts derive
income generally from rents and mortgages, the investment company
from dividends and interest on corporate bonds. Dividends are paid
from the corporate income after payment of the corporate tax by
the distributing corporation. Moreover, the tax on dividends received
by a corporation from stocks held in other corporations is only
fifteen per cent.' 8 Thus, a major portion of the income of regulated
investment companies is taxed prior to distribution to the company;
and the conduit tax provision, insofar as dividends are concerned,
costs the government a maximum of 7.8 per cent of the dividend
income of the regulated investment companies."9 Commercial rents
and interest on mortgages are expenses of taxpayers which are fully
deductible, 20 and taxable as income to corporate recipients. The
conduit provision for realty trusts allows this income to completely
escape the corporate tax if it is distributed in the year received. The
realty trust conduit is therefore costing the government fifty-two per
cent on all the distributed income of the trust.
21
If the income of regulated investment companies and realty trusts
were taxed in the same manner prior to distribution to the beneficial
owners,2 2 the initial tax similarity does not necessarily warrant con-
tinued tax equality. Tax exceptions or benefits are used in an attempt
to encourage a particular activity deemed to be in the public interest.
An exception to the tax code for the purpose of stimulating invest-
ments in one sector of the economy should not necessitate the same
tax treatment for all forms of investment. Real estate and stocks and
bonds are separate and independent areas, and the tax treatment of
each should be based upon its own merits and needs, rather than upon
superficial structural similarities.
The second reason given by the House Ways and Means Committee
for the legislation, that of increasing the amount of investment capital
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 241-47.
19. The tax on taxable income of a corporation is limited to 52%. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 11. The tax on income from dividends received therefor is 52% of
15%. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 243. This percentage would be less if the cor-
poration's income did not exceed $25,000.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 162(a) (3), 163. Non-business rents however are
not deductible.
21. The tax would be only 30% if the corporation's taxable income did not
exceed $25,000. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11.
22. The House Committee on Ways and Means contends that this is the case
since the interest income of regulated investment companies is a deductible expense
of the payor. H.R. Rep. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960).
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for real estate purposes was that it is "particularly important at the
present time because of the shortage of private capital and mortgage
money for individual homes, apartment houses, office buildings,
factories and hotels.23 Assuming the need for greater capital invest-
ment in real estate, the desirability of tax benefit legislation for this
purpose must depend upon its effectiveness in accomplishing this end
as against any undesirable ends that could result.
II. ECONOMIC ASPECTS
The economic pros and cons that will result from this legislation
are a matter of calculated speculation. Two primary assumptions
can safely be made for this purpose. First, that the legislation will
not increase the rate of savings. There is no reason to believe that
the trust legislation will attract new investment capital that has not
in the past been attracted to other available investment opportunities.
Second, the amount of capital that will be transferred from other
forms of investment into real estate depends largely upon the com-
parative return and risk between the trust and the other investment
sources. The risk and return on investment in a trust depends, of
course, upon the nature of the investment made by the trust within
the limits set forth in the act.
A. Competition-Savings and Loan Associations
A trust could invest its capital solely in mortgages. 24 This would
be a comparatively safe form of investment, especially if the mort-
gages are insured. The trust will be in competition with savings and
loan associations for savings to invest in mortgages. Similarly, the
distributions to shareholders by mutual savings and loan associa-
tions are deductible from the taxable income of the association.25 The
savings and loan associations, however, offer three distinct advantages
to investors not offered by real estate investment trusts: insured
deposits; a liquid ownership interest represented by cash deposits
which may be easily increased or decreased in whole or part; and
the ability to charge "points' ' 26 for the granting of a loan which
does not affect its tax status.
A real estate investment trust investing primarily in mortgages
cannot expect to receive a greater return on mortgages than does a
savings and loan association. The market value of the ownership
23. Ibid.
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856(c).
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 591.
26. "Points" are the charges made in addition to the interest charge. It is
used on risk property or in a time of tight money as a charge for making the loan.
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share in the trust should remain relatively constant, since there will
be little speculation in the prospective earnings of the trust in relation
to its capital assets. The purchasing and selling of the ownership
certificate, in limited amounts, cannot be accomplished with the ease
or simplicity of making and withdrawing deposits; and furthermore,
a broker's commission may be charged. The trust is also at a
disadvantage since it probably will not be able to use "points" as a
means of collecting a higher interest charge in periods of tight
money.27
On the basis of the above considerations, it is difficult to visualize
a real estate investment trust specializing in mortgages having much
impact on the present investment market. The amount of investment
return offered by the realty trust investing in mortgages in excess
of that offered by savings and loan associations probably will not
be significant enough to induce investors desiring to invest in
mortgages to pass up the advantage offered by mutual savings and
loan associations. If this were not the case, the return might not be
significant enough to attract investors from other areas into mortgage
investment-certainly, not to the degree that is necessary to warrant
a sizable tax revenue loss to the government.
B. Qualification Requirements-Too Burdensome?
The qualifying requirements for a real estate investment trust
which invests solely in real estate equities, or in equities and mort-
gages, will hinder the trust's operation and investment appeal. The
trust is restricted in the amount of active control to be exercised and
in decisions to sell some or all of its real estate interests.28 It is also
limited by the distribution requirement as to the amount of "leverage"
it can exercise. 29 Problems arise when a potential acquisition of
property requires that the lease contain an overage provision based
on net income;30 if the trust is forced to operate a particular prop-
erty;31 or if the acquisition of a particular property requires that the
trust take title to personal property along with the real estate 2
27. "Points" or service charges for making a loan cannot be included as income
for purpose of the income requirements. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2 (c) (2)
(ii), 26 Fed. Reg. 605 (1961).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856.
29. The trust must distribute 90% of its taxable income in order to qualify for
conduit treatment. Mortgage principal payments are not deductible. The prin-
cipal payments on a large mortgage could prevent the trust from meeting the dis-
tribution requirement. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857.
30. Rent as defined in this section excludes rent that is determined by the
income or profits of the lessee from the property. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
856 (d) (1).
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856(d) (3).
32. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 856(c) (2), (3). The trust is disqualified if 10%
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It is difficult to predict the return that a trust investing in real
estate equities will offer, as this will vary with the amount of risk or
speculation that a trust will undertake in light of the qualification
requirements. However, the type of real estate that realty trusts will
be inclined to invest in, is the prime or choice property. There has
never been a shortage of investment capital for this type of property
when all other areas of investment have not also felt a need for
increased investment. The report of the House Committee on Ways
and Means did not specifically state the types of real estate that need
more investment capital, but used the broad categories of "individual
homes, apartment houses, office buildings, factories and hotels. '33
The Committee must have been looking to the real estate in each of
these classes that involves risk and speculation which make it less
attractive to investors, particularly the institutional investors. Risk
property is not a sound investment for realty trusts because of the
limitations on management, income and sale.3 4 The only relief that
realty trusts will afford risk property is if their entry into the realty
market indirectly causes other real estate investors to invest in more
speculative property because of the added competition in the prime
property market.
C. Advantageous ta those already in the real estate market
The real potential of the real estate investment trust rests with
the group of established real estate investors. The legislation provides
an avenue for diversification for individual investment property own-
ers. Now they may pool their properties and acquire wider realty
interests without increasing their tax burden. Also, the existing
real estate investment trusts which have previously been taxed as a
corporation will undoubtedly attempt to qualify for the conduit tax
treatment. 3 The advantage of the conduit tax would seem to offset
any modification in operation that will be necessary in most cases,3 6
unless the existing trust has a substantial depreciation shelter which
offsets the corporate tax.
Real estate syndicates, organized as partnerships, comprise an-
or more of its income is derived from, or 25% or more of its assets consist of,
personal property.
33. H.R. Rep. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960).
34. A realty trust will not want to get involved with speculative property since
it cannot direct, manage or sell the property without being in danger of dis-
qualifying itself for the conduit treatment. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 856 (c),
(d).
85. See Ablon, Real Estate Investment Trusts and Alternative Forms of In-
vestment, 7 Prac. Law 13-26 (1961).
86. Lease provisions, control and ownership of things other than real estate
assets will have to be reviewed and modified according to each situation.
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other potential class to be attracted to the realty trust. The syndicates
are formed as limited partnerships, possessing many of the advan-
tages of the corporate form, without the disadvantage of double
taxation. However, the tax status of the syndicates has been con-
tinually in doubt, and intentional avoidance of the "association"
classification has resulted in ambiguous restrictions on their activ-
ities.3 7 Also, syndicates generally have lacked diversification, and the
lack of a formal secondary market for investor liquidity has stifled
their investment appeal. In the past few years, corporations, com-
monly called "syndicate successor corporations," have been formed by
combinations of syndicates which have jointly incorporated to over-
come prior individual shortcomings, notwithstanding the added ex-
pense of the corporate tax;3SS that is, if the corporate tax is not offset
by depreciation deductions. The real estate investment trust provides
syndicators with an alternative to the corporate form, permits in-
creased diversification and the issuing of transferable ownership
certificates readily marketable through a security exchange. The
trust also allows the syndicate to depart from the questionable area
of the "association" classification for tax purposes. The extent to
which syndicates will elect to be taxed as real estate investment
trusts depends largely upon the changes in current practice that
will be required for qualification. There are undoubtedly syndicates
that cannot qualify because of the type of property held; or because
of an unwillingness to relinquish direct control over the property;
or control in the management of the investment fund; or where the
syndicate purposely holds property for short periods, taking a rapid
depreciation and subsequent sale to realize a capital gain.3 Never-
theless, the realty trust offers great possibilities for syndicates, and
this potential will undoubtedly be tapped.
Corporations with substantial real estate holdings have also ex-
pressed an interest in realty trusts.4 0 A corporation could transfer
its real estate to a trust in exchange for ownership certificates which
37. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a); Treas. Reg. § 301, 7701-2 (1960). See,
Rustigan, Effect of Regulation Definitions on Real Estate Syndicates, 19 N.Y.U.
19th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1065 (1961).
38. Real estate investors can depreciate their property either by a straight
line or an acceleration method. An able investor can offset the income on his
property substantially by skillful trading and use of the correct depreciation scale.
39. Ablon, supra note 35 at 18.
40. Ernest Henderson, president of the Sheraton Hotels, announced shortly
after the passage of the Realty Trust provision that his company had taken pre-
liminary steps to convert the hotel chain into a real estate investment trust. The
Hilton, Knott and Hotel Corporation of America chains have also expressed
similar interests. N. Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1960, § 3, p. 1, col. 4, at 9, col. 2.
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would then be passed on to the shareholders."4 The trust would lease
back the property to the corporation for continued use as before.
Complications arise if ten per cent or more of the stock of the corpora-
tion is owned by the trust either directly or indirectly under the rules
for attribution in Section 318 (a) of the Code. 42 In this event, the
trust would not be qualified as the rent would not be includible under
the ninety per cent income requirement. The other requirements could
be more easily attained by the corporation in establishing the trust
since no change in ownership interest of the shareholders is required.
The realty trust is of no value to corporations which have a tax
shelter provided by the depreciation on their real estate. Where the
property has been fully depreciated, however, a sale and leaseback to
a realty trust established in conjunction with the corporation, permits
a rental deduction by the corporation while enjoying continued use
of the property. The rental charge could be based upon the past
earnings and geared in such a manner that the distributions of the
trust of this rental income would not exceed the normal dividend
distributions of the corporation. 43 The rental income of the trust is
then passed through the tax conduit shareholder-beneficiary. The
corporation retains the same control over the property as lessee
and its shareholders as beneficiaries of the trust.44
The capital gains provisions for the realty trusts is another
reason for corporations to make use of the trust. The legislation
provides for a special twenty-five per cent tax on the capital gains of
the trust remaining after the distribution of capital gains dividends. 45
The capital gains dividend is taxed to the beneficiary as a long-term
41. There is a question of whether this transfer would be tax free under § 351
of the Code. Proposed regulation § 1.856-1 (e) indicates that the provisions of
subchapter C of the Code are applicable except where "inconsistent" with §:§
856-58. The extent to which § 351 might be inconsistent with §§ 856-58 is not clear.
42. The trust cannot own more than 10% of the total number of shares of all
classes of the lessee. The attribution rules of § 318 (a) are applicable with attri-
bution running between a corporation and a 10% (rather than 50%) stockholder.
Thus, any person who owns as much as 10% in value of the beneficial interests
of the trust cannot own a 10% interest in the lessee entity. The property cannot
be leased to any 10% shareholder individually, nor to any partnership or cor-
poration in which a 10% shareholder has as much as a 10% interest. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 856 (d) (2). Also, a lease back may be ruled out by the 25% asset
test of § 856(c) (5) (B) since the trust is prohibited from owning more than 10%
of the outstanding voting securities of any issuer.
43. The rent cannot be based on current earnings of the lessee. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 856 (d) (1). However, a corporation that has owned the property over
a period of time should be able to make a close estimate of the property's earning
capacity or the corporation's profits. See also note 38 supra.
44. Nothing in the amendment prevents a trustee of the trust from serving as
an officer of the corporation.
45. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(b) (3) (A).
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capital gain.48 This income, if not for the trust legislation, would be
taxable as normal income to the shareholder. 47 The advantages of this
provision for investors in a high tax bracket provides a strong in-
ducement for realty trust investment operating in conjunction with
the corporations.
CONCLUSION
The use of realty trusts by existing corporations to avoid taxation
does not come within the stated purposes for the realty trust legisla-
tion.48 Nor does the adoption of the realty trust by syndicates, trusts
or investors who hold property individually, fulfill the purpose of
attracting more investment capital for real estate, absent a public
sale of securities. 49 However, the greatest potential use of realty
trusts lies with these groups that have established realty interests.
Admittedly, the formulation of new organizations as realty trusts
and the public sale of securities by existing organizations that elect
to be treated as realty trusts will provide increased investment equal-
ity and attract investment capital into real estate. But the capital
that is attracted by this means will not be in the quantity nor in-
vested in areas that will result in a noticeable change in current real
estate conditions.
The tax benefits afforded by the realty trust legislation carry a
corresponding loss of tax revenue to the government. If hotel chains,
railroads and other corporations with substantial realty holdings
elect to be treated in part as real estate investment trusts as indicated,
the tax loss will exceed the Treasury's conservative estimate of seven
million dollars. Tax reductions in a period of mounting government
expenditures should be limited to areas where a substantial construc-
tive end is achieved. The realty trust legislation does not meet this
requirement but only eliminates a minor tax inequity and affords
limited relief at most to the shortage of investment capital for real
estate. Tax revenue certainly seems more important than these
accomplishments.
The realty trust legislation opens up a tax loophole that corpora-
tions can use for substantial tax savings. The current administra-
tion's position regarding preferential tax treatment was succinctly
46. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 857(b) (3) (C). A capital gain dividend is any
dividend designated as capital gain by the trust and which consists of the excess
of the net long-term capital gain over the net short-term capital loss of the trust
during the taxable year.
47. A capital gain realized by a corporation cannot be passed on to the stock-
holder as a capital gain.
48. See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra.
49. Ibid.
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stated by President Kennedy in a special message on taxes to Con-
gress:
[S] pecial provisions have developed into an increasing source of
preferential treatment to various groups. Whenever one taxpayer
is permitted to pay less, someone else must be asked to pay more.
The uniform distribution of the tax burden is thereby disturbed
and higher rates are made necessary by the narrowing of the tax
base. Of course, some departures from uniformity are needed
to promote desirable social or economic objectives of overriding
importance which can be achieved most effectively through the
tax mechanism. But many of the preferences which have devel-
oped do not meet such a test and need to be re-evaluated in our
tax reform program.-
If the reasons given by the House Committee on Ways and Means
are accepted at face value as the real intention for the passing of
the realty trust legislation, a tax windfall to active business corpora-
tions was not intended. This potential tax benefit to corporations
makes the limited relief afforded by the legislation even more costly
and increases the list of tax loopholes that the current administration
hopes to eliminate.
Perhaps it is impossible to limit tax legislation so that only the
interests intended to be served are served. But if this is impossible,
would not the status quo be preferable to the unmerited tax benefits
that result from piecemeal additions to the Internal Revenue Code
such as the realty trust amendment?
50. Special Message on Taxes Submitted by President John F. Kennedy to
Congress, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1961, p. 18.
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